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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

The decisions of the United States supreme court that are embodied in
treasury decisions Nos. 3270 and 3271, in our opinion, should be entitled
“When a stock dividend is not a stock dividend.” These decisions are
much alike in the question at issue, the latter of them representing the case
of Rockefeller versus the United States which had much newspaper
publicity.
The court’s reasoning with respect to the matter at issue is more clearly
revealed in the decision contained in treasury decision 3270, and we bespeak
for it a careful reading. Some exceedingly fine distinctions were made by
the court and it is difficult for the ordinary individual to see the fine line
drawn between that which we have ordinarily considered a stock dividend
and that phase of a stock dividend which places it in the class of an actual
dividend. It is easier to comprehend the viewpoint of those members of
the court who dissented from the decision especially when they expressed
the following opinion: “It seems incredible that congress intended to tax
as income a business transaction which admittedly produced no gain, no
profit and hence no income.”
Other decisions published in this issue are not of the importance of
those commented upon in the foregoing paragraphs, but are worthy of close
attention.
(T. D. 3268—January 5, 1922)
Income tax—Withholding from partnerships
Section 221 of the revenue act of 1921 provides for withholding of a
tax equal to 8 per cent. from the annual or periodical gains, profits, or
income of a partnership composed in whole or in part of non-resident aliens.
(See sec. 221.) However, in the case of a partnership having an office or
place of business in the United States, withholding will not be required
even though one or more of the members thereof is a non-resident alien;
the partnership, however, as agent of the non-resident alien member or
members, shall file a return of the income of such non-resident alien mem
ber or members in accordance with the provisions of article 404 of regu
lations No. 45, and the corresponding article of regulations No. 62, to be
promulgated under the revenue act of 1921.
(T. D. 3269—January 5, 1922)
Income tax—Section 250 (d)—Appeals—Hearings
Section 250 (d) of the revenue act of 1921 provides that if upon exami
nation of a return made under the revenue acts of 1916, 1917, 1918, or 1921,
an income or excess-profits tax or a deficiency therein (which deficiency
is defined in section 250 (b) as meaning the difference, to the extent not
covered by any credit due to the taxpayer under section 252, between the
amount of the tax already paid and that which should have been paid) is
discovered the taxpayer shall be notified thereof and shall have the right
of an appeal and a hearing before the assessment is made. As soon as
practicable, therefore, after a return is filed, whether by the taxpayer or
as provided in section 3176, revised statutes, as amended, it is examined.
If upon examination of a return made under the revenue act of 1916, the
revenue act of 1917, the revenue act of 1918, or the revenue act of 1921,
a tax or a deficiency in tax is discovered, the taxpayer shall be notified
thereof by letter and shall be given a reasonable time after such notice
is sent in which to protest and file exceptions specifying the reasons why
the tax or deficiency should not be assessed.
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(a) If the taxpayer protests against the proposed assessment after the
first notification by mail, as above set forth, he will present his exceptions
in writing to the income-tax unit or to the division thereof where the said
proposed assessment is being considered. Such exceptions must state fully
the facts and grounds upon which the taxpayer relies. A reasonable addi
tional time in which to file other data in support of the taxpayer’s con
tentions may be allowed upon request showing cause for such extension.
A hearing shall be granted the taxpayer, if requested by him; if no hearing
is requested a decision will be made by the income-tax unit upon the
written data submitted. Whether a hearing is had or not, a decision shall
be made by the income-tax unit at the earliest practicable date and the
taxpayer notified thereof. The notification of the decision of the incometax unit shall be made by registered mail, and a period of not less than
30 days given the taxpayer in which to file an appeal to the commissioner
and show cause or reason why such tax or deficiency should not be paid.
Full 30 days from the mailing (not the receipt) of such notice to file an
appeal shall be given the taxpayer. The appeal must be filed in the office
of the commissioner in Washington within 31 days from the mailing of
the notice, but if it is mailed in time to be received by the commissioner
within such period in the ordinary course of the mails it will be considered
as having been filed within such period. No particular form of appeal is
required, but said appeal must set forth specifically the exceptions upon
which said appeal is taken. The appeal shall be under oath and must con
tain a statement that it is not taken for the purpose of delay. Opportunity
for a hearing shall be granted if requested within a reasonable time. The
taxpayer in his appeal may rely upon the data previously submitted, or he
may obtain a reasonable extension of time, if cause therefor is shown, in
which to file additional data, evidence, or argument. Such request shall be
under oath, and must state specifically the reasons for additional time.
When a decision has been made by the proper officer, employee, or em
ployees of the bureau and approved by the commissioner, an assessment,
if any, shall be made forthwith in accordance with the terms of said
decision.
(b) If the taxpayer does not protest within the time fixed by the first
notification by mail, then and in that case the proposed assessment shall
be the decision of the income-tax unit and the taxpayer shall be notified
thereof. This notification of the decision of the income-tax unit shall be
made by registered mail and a period of not less than 30 days given the
taxpayer in which to file an appeal to the commissioner and to show cause
or reason why such tax or deficiency should not be paid. The procedure
on said appeal shall be the same as in the case of an appeal to the com
missioner as provided in (a) above.
In the case of a return which is examined in the collector’s office where
a tax or deficiency of tax is discovered and notice of the proposed assess
ment is sent out by the collector, the procedure shall be the same in said
collector’s office as herein provided for in the income-tax unit. The
decision of the collector may be appealed from, which appeal shall be to
the commissioner at Washington and shall follow the same procedure as
provided for in (a) or (b) above.
No assessment under 250 (d) shall be made without notification to the
taxpayer of his right to appeal and show cause, except that in any case
where the commissioner believes that the collection of the amount due
will be jeopardized by delay, he may make the assessment without giving
such notice or awaiting the conclusion of a hearing.
Where a taxpayer has been given an opportunity of appeal and has not
done so, as above set forth, and an assessment has been made, or where a
taxpayer has appealed and an assessment in accordance with the final
decision on such appeal has been made, no claim in abatement of the
assessment will be entertained.
Where an assessment has been made without giving the taxpayer an
opportunity to appeal or without awaiting a decision on an appeal that
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has been perfected, a bona fide claim in abatement of the assessment, filed
within 10 days after such notice and demand by the collector, may be
entertained.
(T. D. 3270—January 12, 1922)
Income taxes—Revenue act of October 3, 1913—Decision of Supreme
Court.
1. Income—Dividends—Income in Way of Dividends.
Under Section II (b) of the act of October 3, 1913, declaring that in
come shall include, among other things, gains derived “from interest, rent,
dividends, securities, * * * or gains or profits and income derived from
any source whatever,” not everything in the form of a dividend must be
treated as income, but income in the way of dividends shall be taxed.
2. Same—Surplus of Accumulated Profits Distributed to Stock
holders in the Form of Stock of Another Corporation—Dis
tinguished from Stock Dividends
Where a stockholder, as the result of a reorganization and financial
readjustment of the business of the corporation, received as a dividend on
each share of common stock held by him two shares of the common stock
of a new corporation, the dividend so received representing the surplus of
accumulated profits of the first corporation, and the shares so received
having a market value separate and distinct from the original share, such
dividend was a gain, a profit, derived from his capital interest in the old
company, and constituted individual income to the stockholder within the
meaning of the income-tax law of 1913. The rule laid down in Peabody v.
Eisner (247 U. S., 347), followed; Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S., 189)
distinguished.
3. Same—Effect of No Change in Aggregate Market Value of Shares.
That a comparison of the market value of the stockholder’s shares in
the old corporation immediately before, with the aggregate market value
of those shares plus the dividend shares immediately after the dividend
showed no change in the aggregate is immaterial and is not a proper test
for determining whether individual income, taxable against the stockholder,
has been received by means of the dividend.
4. Same—Effect of Antecedent Transfers of Stock.
The question whether a dividend made out of company profits consti
tutes income of the stockholder is not affected by antecedent transfers of
the stock from hand to hand.
5. Corporations—Reorganization—Separate Entity.
Where a new corporation was formed under the laws of another state,
to take over the business and business assets of an old corporation, having
authorized capital amounting to nearly four times the aggregate stock
issues and funded debt of the old company, of which less than one-half
was to be issued at once to the old company or its stockholders, held that
the new corporation was not identical with the old, but was a separate and
distinct corporate entity, despite the fact that both corporations had for the
time being the same personnel of officers and stockholders, having the
same proportionate holdings of stock in both companies.
6. Income—Effect of Reorganization of Corporation upon Aggregate
Body of Stockholders.
The question whether an individual stockholder derived income in the
true and substantial sense through receiving a part in the distribution of
the new shares can not be tested by regarding alone the general effect of
the reorganization upon the aggregate body of stockholders; the liability
of a stockholder to pay an individual income tax must be tested by the
effect of the transaction upon the individual.
The appended decision of the Supreme Court of the United States,
rendered November 21, 1921, in the case of United States v. C. W. Phellis,
is published for your information. The decision reverses the judgment of
the Court of Claims in the case of C. W. Phellis v. United States.
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Supreme Court of the United States. No. 260. October Term, 1921.
United States of America, appellant, v. C. W. Phellis.
Appeal from the Court of Claims.
[November 21, 1921.]
Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court:
The court below sustained the claim of C. W. Phellis for a refund of
certain moneys paid by him under protest in discharge of an additional tax
assessed against him for the year 1915, based upon alleged income equiva
lent to the market value of 500 shares of stock of a Delaware corporation
called the E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., received by him as a dividend
upon his 250 shares of stock of the E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co.,
a New Jersey Corporation. The United States appeals.
From the findings of the Court of Claims, read in connection with
claimant’s petition, the following essential facts appear: In and prior to
September, 1915, the New Jersey company had been engaged for many
years in the business of manufacturing and selling explosives. Its funded
debt and its capital stock at par values were as follows:
5 per cent. mortgage bonds ........................... $1,230,000
4½ per cent. 30-year bonds ........................... 14,166,000
Preferred stock ($100 shares) ....................... 16,068,600
Common stock ($100 shares) ......................... 29,427,100
Total ............................................................ $60,891,700
It had an excess of assets over liabilities showing a large surplus of
accumulated profits; the precise amount is not important, except that it
should be stated that it was sufficient to cover the dividend distribution
presently to be mentioned. In that month a reorganization and financial
adjustment of the business was resolved upon and carried into effect with
the assent of a sufficient proportion of the stockholders, in which a new
corporation was formed under the laws of Delaware with an authorized
capital stock of $240,000,000, to consist in part of debenture stock bearing
6 per cent cumulative dividends, in part of common stock; and to this new
corporation all the assets and goodwill of the New Jersey company were
transferred as an entirety and as a going concern, as of October 1, 1915,
at a valuation of $120,000,000, the new company assuming all the obliga
tions of the old except its capital stock and funded debt. In payment of
the consideration the old company retained $1,484,100 in cash to be used
in redemption of its outstanding 5 per cent. mortgage bonds, and received
$59,661,700 par value in debenture stock of the new company (of which
$30,234,600 was to be used in taking up, share for share and dollar for
dollar, the preferred stock of the old company and redeeming its 30-year
bonds), and $58,854,200 par value of the common stock of the new company
which was to be and was immediately distributed among the common
stockholders of the old company as a dividend, paying them two shares of
the new stock for each share they held in the old company. This plan was
carried out by appropriate corporate action; the new company took over
all the assets of the old company, and that company besides paying off
its 5 per cent. bonds acquired debenture stock of the new company suffi
cient to liquidate its 4½½ per cent. 30-year bonds and retire its preferred
stock, additional debenture stock equal in amount at par to its own out
standing common stock, and also (two shares of common stock of the
Delaware corporation for each share of the outstanding common stock of
the New Jersey corporation. Each holder of the New Jersey company’s
common stock (including claimant), retained his old stock and besides
received a dividend of two shares for one in common stock of the Delaware
company, and the New Jersey corporation retained in its treasury 6 per
cent. debenture stock of the Delaware corporation equivalent to the par
value of its own outstanding common stock. The personnel of the stock
holders and officers of the two corporations was on October 1, 1915,
identical, the new company having elected the same officers as the old;
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and the holders of common stock in both corporations had the same pro
portionate stockholding in each. After the reorganization and the dis
tribution of the stock of the Delaware corporation, the New Jersey cor
poration continued as a going concern, and still exists, but except for the
redemption of its outstanding bonds, the exchange of debenture stock for
its preferred stock, and the holding of debenture stock to an amount
equivalent to its own outstanding common and the collection and disposition
of dividends thereon, it has done no business. It is not, however, in
process of liquidation. It has received as income upon the Delaware
company’s debenture stock held by it dividends to the amount of 6 per
cent. per annum, which it has paid out to its own stockholders, including
the claimant. The fair market value of the stock of the New Jersey
corporation on September 30, 1915, prior to the reorganization, was $795
per share, and its fair market value, after the execution of the contracts
between the two corporations, was on October 1, 1915, $100 per share. The
fair market value of the stock of the Delaware corporation distributed as
aforesaid was on October 1, 1915, $347.50 per share. The commissioner
of internal revenue held that the 500 shares of Delaware company stock
acquired by claimant in the distribution was income of the value of $347.50
per share and assessed the additional tax accordingly.
The Court of Claims, observing that from the facts as found claimant’s
250 shares of stock in the New Jersey corporation were worth on the
market, prior to the transfer and dividend, precisely the same that the
same shares plus the Delaware company’s shares received by him were
worth thereafter, and that he did not gain any increase in the value of
his aggregate holdings by the operation, held that the whole transaction
was to be regarded as merely a financial reorganization of the business of
the company, producing to him no profit and hence no income, and that the
distribution was in effect a stock dividend nontaxable as income under the
authority of Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S., 189), and not within the
rule of Peabody v. Eisner (247 U. S., 347).
We recognize the importance of regarding matters of substance and
disregarding forms in applying the provisions of the sixteenth amendment
and income-tax laws enacted thereunder. In a number of cases besides
those just cited we have under varying conditions followed the rule.—
Lynch v. Turrish (247 U. S., 221); Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe (247
U. S., 330) ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Lewellyn (248 U. S., 71).
The act under which the tax now in question was imposed (act of
October 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat., 114, 166-167), declares that income shall
include, among other things, gains derived “from interest, rent, dividends,
securities, or the transaction of any lawful business carried on for gain or
profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever.”
Disregarding the slight looseness of construction, we interpret “gains,
profits, and income derived from * * * dividends,” etc., as meaning
not that everything in the form of a dividend must be treated as income,
but that income derived in the way of dividends shall be taxed. Hence
the inquiry must be whether the shares of stock in the new company re
reived by claimant as a dividend by reason of his ownership of stock in
the old company constituted (to apply the tests laid down in Eisner v.
Macomber [252 U. S., 189, 207]), a gain derived from capital, not a gain
accruing to capital, nor a growth or increment of value in the investment,
but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the
property, severed from the capital however invested, and coming in—
that is, received or drawn by the claimant for his separate use, benefit,
and disposal.
Claimant’s capital investment was represented by his New Jersey shares.
Whatever increment of value had accrued to them prior to September 30,
1915, by reason of the surplus profits that theretofore had been accumu
lated by the company, was still a part of claimant’s capital, from which as
yet he had derived no actual and therefore no taxable income so far as
the surplus remained undistributed. As yet he had no right to withdraw
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it or any part of it, could not have such right until action by the company
or its. proper representatives, and his interest still was but the general prop
erty interest of a stockholder in the entire assets, business and affairs of
the company—a capital interest, as we declared in Eisner v. Macomber,
supra (p. 208).
Upon the face of things, however, the transfer of the old company’s
assets to the new company in exchange for the securities issued by the
latter, and the distribution of those securities by the old company among
its stockholders, changed the former situation materially. The common
stock of the new company, after its transfer to the old company and prior
to its distribution, constituted assets of the old company which it now held
to represent its surplus of accumulated profits—still, however, a common
fund in which the individual stockholders of the old company had no
separate interest. But when this common stock was distributed among the
common stockholders of the old company as a dividend, then at once—
unless the two companies must be regarded as substantially identical—the
individual stockholders of the old company, including claimant, received
assets of exchangeable and actual value severed from their capital interest
in the old company, proceeding from it as the result of a division of former
corporate profits, and drawn by them severally for their individual and
separate use and benefit. Such a gain resulting from their ownership of
stock in the old company and proceeding from it constituted individual
income in the proper sense.
That a comparison of the market value of claimant’s shares in the New
Jersey corporation immediately before, with the aggregate market value
of those shares plus the dividend shares immediately after the dividend
showed no change in the aggregate—a fact relied upon by the court of
claims as demonstrating that claimant neither gained nor lost pecuniarily
in the transaction—seems to us a circumstance of no particular importance
in the present inquiry. Assuming the market values were a precise reflex
of intrinsic values, they would show merely that claimant acquired no
increase in aggregate wealth through the mere effect of the reorganization
and consequent dividend, not that the dividend did not constitute income.
There would remain the presumption that the value of the New Jersey
shares immediately prior to the transaction reflected the original capital
investment plus the accretions which had resulted through the company’s
business activities and constituted its surplus; a surplus in which until
dividend made the individual stockholder had no property interest except
as it increased the valuation of his capital. It is the appropriate function
of a dividend to convert a part of a surplus thus accumulated from
property of the company into property of the individual stockholders; the
stockholder’s share being thereby released to and drawn by him as profits
or income derived from the company. That the distribution reduces the
intrinsic capital value of the shares by an equal amount is a normal and
necessary effect of all dividend distributions—whether large or small and
whether paid in money or in other divisible assets—but such reduction
constitutes the dividend none the less income derived by the stockholder
if it represents gains previously acquired by the corporation. Hence, a
comparison of aggregate values immediately before with those immedi
ately after the dividend is not a proper test for determining whether indi
vidual income, taxable against the stockholder, has been received by
means of the dividend.
The possibility of occasional instances of apparent hardship in the
incidents of the tax may be conceded. Where, as in this case, the dividend
constitutes a distribution of profits accumulated during an extended period
and bears a large proportion to the par value of the stock, if an investor
happened to buy stock shortly before the dividend, paying a price enhanced
by an estimate of the capital plus the surplus of the company, and after
distribution of the surplus, with corresponding reduction in the intrinsic
and market value of the shares, he were called upon to pay a tax upon the
dividend received, it might look in his case like a tax upon his capital.
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But it is only apparently so. In buying at a price that reflected the accu
mulated profits, he of course acquired as a part of the valuable rights
purchased the prospect of a dividend from the accumulations—bought
“dividend on,” as the phrase goes—and necessarily took subject to the
burden of the income tax proper to be assessed against him by reason of
the dividend if and when made. He simply stepped into the shoes, in this
as in other respects, of the stockholder whose shares he acquired, and
presumably the prospect of a dividend influenced the price paid, and was
discounted by the prospect of an income tax to be paid thereon. In short,
the question whether a dividend made out of company profits constitutes
income of the stockholder is not affected by antecedent transfers of the
stock from hand to hand.
There is more force in the suggestion that, looking through and through
the entire transaction out of which the distribution came, it was but a
financial reorganization of the business as it stood before, without dimi
nution of the aggregate assets or change in the general corporate objects
and purposes, without change of personnel either in officers or stockholders,
or change in the proportionate interest of any individual stockholder. The
argument, in effect, is that there was no loss of essential identity on the
part of the company, only a change of the legal habiliments in which the
aggregate corporate interests were clothed, no substantial realization by
individual stockholders out of the previous accumulation of corporate
profits, merely a distribution of additional certificates indicating an increase
in the value of their capital holdings. This brings into view the general
effect of the combined action of the entire body of stockholders as a mass.
In such matters, what was done, rather than the design and purpose of
the participants, should be the test. However, in this case there is no
difference. The proposed plan was set out in a written communication
from the president of the New Jersey corporation to the stockholders, a
written assent signed by about 90 per cent. of the stockholders, a written
agreement made between the old company and the new, and a bill of sale
made by the former to the latter, all of which are in the findings. The
plan as thus proposed and adopted, and as carried out, involved the forma
tion of a new corporation to take over the business and the business assets
of the old; it was to be and was formed under the laws of a different state,
which necessarily imports a different measure of responsibility to the
public, and presumably different rights between stockholders and company
and between stockholders inter se, than before. The articles of association
of neither company is made to appear, but in favor of the asserted identity
between the companies we will assume (contrary to the probabilities) that
there was no significant difference here. But the new company was to
have authorized capital stock aggregating $240,000,000—nearly four times
the aggregate stock issues and funded debt of the old company—of which
less than one-half ($118,515,900) was to be issued presently to the old
company or its stockholders, leaving the future disposition of a majority
of the authorized new issues still to be determined. There was no present
change of officers or stockholders, but manifestly a continuation of identity
in this respect depended upon continued unanimous consent or concurrent
action of a multitude of individual stockholders actuated by motives and
influences necessarily to some extent divergent. In the light of all this
we can not regard the new company as virtually identical with the old,
but must treat it as a substantial corporate body with its own separate
identity, and its stockholders as having property rights and interests
materially different from those incident to ownership of stock in the old
company.
The findings show that it was intended to be established as such, and
that it was so created in fact and in law. There is nothing to warrant us
in treating this separateness as imaginary, unless the identity of the body
of stockholders and the transfer in solido of the manufacturing business
and assets from the old company to the new necessarily have that effect.
But the identity of stockholders was but a temporary condition, subject
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to change at any moment at the option of any individual. As to the assets,
the very fact of their transfer from one company to the other evidenced
the actual separateness of the two companies.
But further, it would be erroneous, we think, to test the question whether
an individual stockholder derived income in the true and substantial sense
through receiving a part in the distribution of the new shares, by regarding
alone the general effect of the reorganization upon the aggregate body of
stockholders. The liability of a stockholder to pay an individual income
tax must be tested by the effect of the transaction upon the individual.
It was a part of the purpose and a necessary result of the plan of reor
ganization, as carried out, that common stock of the new company to the
extent of $58,854,200 should be turned over to the old company, treated
by it as assets to be distributed as against its liability to stockholders for
accrued surplus, and thereupon distributed to them “as a dividend.” The
assent of the stockholders was based upon this as a part of the plan.
In thus creating the common stock of the new company and transfer
ring it to the old company for distribution pro rata among its stockholders,
the parties were acting in the exercise of their rights for the very purpose
of placing the common stockholders individually in possession of new and
substantial property rights in esse, in realization of their former contingent
right to participate eventually in the accumulated surplus. No question is
made but that the proceedings taken were legally adequate to accomplish
the purpose. The new common stock became treasury assets of the old
company, and was capable of distribution as the manufacturing assets
whose place it took were not. Its distribution transferred to the several
stockholders new individual property rights which they severally were
entitled to retain and enjoy, or to sell and transfer, with precisely the
same substantial benefit to each as if the old company had acquired the
stock by purchase from strangers. According to the findings the stock
thus distributed was marketable. There was neither express nor implied
condition, arising out of the plan of reorganization or otherwise, to prevent
any stockholder from selling it; and he could sell his entire portion or any
of it without parting with his capital interest in the parent company, or
affecting his proportionate relation to the interests of other stockholders.
Whether he sold the new stock for money or retained it in preference, in
either case when he received it he received as his separate property a part
of the accumulated profits of the old company in which previously he had
only a potential and contingent interest.
It thus appears that in substance and fact, as well as in appearance,
the dividend received by claimant was a gain, a profit, derived from his
capital interest in the old company, not in liquidation of the capital but in
distribution of accumulated profits of the company; something of exchange
able value produced by and proceeding from his investment therein, severed
from it and drawn by him for his separate use. Hence it constituted
individual income within the meaning of the income-tax law, as clearly
as was the case in Peabody v. Eisner (247 U. S., 347).
Judgment of the court of claims reversed, and the cause remanded
with directions to dismiss the suit.
DISSENTING OPINION

Mr. Justice McReynolds : In the course of its opinion, citing Eisner v.
Macomber (252 U. S., 189, 213), the court of claims declared:
“We think the whole transaction is to be regarded as merely a financial
reorganization of the business of the company and that this view is
justified by the power and duty of the court to look through the form of
the transaction to its substance.” And further, “It seems incredible that
congress intended to tax as income a business transaction which admit
tedly produced no. gain, no profit, and hence no income. If any income had
accrued to the plaintiff by reason of the sale and exchange made it would
doubtless be taxable.”
There were perfectly good reasons for the reorganization, and the good
faith of the parties is not questioned. I assume that the statute was not
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intended to put an embargo upon legitimate reorganizations when deemed
essential for carrying on important enterprises. Eisner v. Macomber was
rightly decided, and the principle which I think it announced seems in
conflict with the decision just announced.
Mr. Justice Van Devanter concurs in this dissent.
(T. D. 3271—January 12, 1922.)
Income taxes—Revenue act of October 3, 1913—Decision of Supreme
Court.
1. Income—Dividends—Stock Distribution.
Where the stockholders of an oil company owning pipe-line and oil
properties caused the organization of a pipe-line company to which it
contracted to convey its pipe-line property, on consideration of which the
pipe-line company agreed to distribute its stock to the stockholders of the
oil company in the same proportion as their existing holdings, the pipe-line
property representing a surplus above the par value of the oil company’s
stock, the shares of the pipe-line company received by the oil company
stockholders in carrying out the contract constituted income to such stock
holders under the revenue act of October 3, 1913.
2. Same—Method of Distribution.
Under the circumstances cited above, the effect was the same whether
the stock was distributed directly by the new corporation to the stock
holders of the old corporation or transferred from the new corporation to
the old corporation, and by the latter distributed to its stockholders.
3. Income—Surplus of Accumulated Profits Distributed to Stock
holders in the Form of Stock of Another Corporation—Dis
tinguished from Stock Dividends.
Where a corporation having a surplus of accumulated profits exchanged
a part of its assets for the common stock of a new corporation, organized
by the stockholders of said corporation to take over a part of the business
and business assets of the old corporation, and then distributed said shares
of common stock to its stockholders, the distribution, whatever its effect
upon the aggregate interests of the mass of stockholders, constituted in
the case of each individual a gain in the form of actual exchangeable
assets transferred to him from the old corporation for his separate use
in partial realization of his former indivisible and contingent interest in
the corporate surplus. It was in substance and effect, not merely in form,
a dividend of profits by the corporation, and individual income to he
stockholder. United States v. Phellis (decided at the same time) followed.
4. Corporations—Reorganization—Separate Entity.
Where a new corporation was formed by the stockholders of an old
corporation to take over a part of the business and a part of the business
assets of the old corporation, with the same officers and stockholders for
the time being having the same proportionate holdings of the common
stock of the new company that they had of the old company, held that the
new corporation was not identical with the old, but was a separate and
distinct corporate entity.
The appended decision of the Supreme Court of the United States,
rendered November 21, 1921, in the cases of John D. Rockefeller v.
United States, and New York Trust Co. et al. v. Edwards, collector, is
published for the information of internal-revenue officers and others con
cerned. This decision affirms the decision of the United States district
court for the southern district of New York (T. D. 3232).
Supreme Court of the United States. Nos. 535 and 536. October
Term, 1921.
535. John D. Rockefeller, plaintiff in error v. United States. 536. New
York Trust Co. and Edith Hale Harkness, executors of the last will
and testament of William L. Harkness, deceased, plaintiffs in error,
v. William H. Edwards, collector of United States internal revenue
for the second district of New York.
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Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District
of New York.
[November 21, 1921.]
Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court:
These two cases were argued together, turn upon like facts, and may
be disposed of in a single opinion. They involve the legality of certain
income taxes assessed against the plaintiff in error in the one case, and
against the testator of plaintiffs in error in the other, under the incometax provisions of the act of October 3, 1913 (ch. 16, 38 Stat., 114, 166-167),
by reason of certain distributions of corporate stocks received by the
respective taxpayers under the following circumstances: In and prior to
the year 1914, the Prairie Oil & Gas Co., a corporation of the State of
Kansas, was engaged in producing, purchasing, and selling crude petroleum,
and transporting it through pipe lines owned by the company in the states
of Kansas and Oklahoma, and elsewhere. At the same time the Ohio Oil
Co., a corporation of the state of Ohio, was engaged in producing and
manufacturing petroleum and mineral oil and transporting the same
through pipe lines owned by it in the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and
Pennsylvania. In the month of June, 1914, it was judicially determined
by this court (The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S., 548), that with respect to
the transportation business these companies were common carriers in
interstate commerce, subject to the act to regulate commerce as amended
by act of June 29, 1906, (ch. 3591, 34 Stat., 584), and as such subject to
the supervision of the interstate commerce commission. By act of Sep
tember 26, 1914 (ch. 311, 38 Stat, 717), the remainder of their business
became subject to the supervision of the federal trade commission. In
order to avoid a probable conflict of federal authority in case the combined
business of production and transportation should continue to be carried on
as theretofore, it was in each case, upon advice of counsel, determined that
the pipe-line property should be owned and operated by a separate corpo
ration. In the case of the Ohio company an added reason for segregation
lay in the fact that by a section of the Ohio general code its entire gross
receipts, including those derived from business other than transportation,
were subject to an annual assessment of 4 per cent. chargeable against the
gross receipts of companies engaged in the transportation business. For
these reasons, the stockholders of the Prairie Oil & Gas Co. caused a
corporation to be organized under the laws of the state of Kansas, by the
name of the Prairie Pipe Line Co., to which all the pipe-line property of
the Prairie Oil & Gas Co. was transferred in consideration of the issue
and delivery of the entire capital stock of the new company, to be dis
tributed pro rata to the stockholders of the Prairie Oil & Gas Co. And
similarly, the stockholders of the Ohio Oil Co. caused a corporation to be
formed under the laws of that state, by the name of the Illinois Pipe
Line Co., to which all the pipe-line property of the Ohio Oil Co. was
transferred in consideration of the issue to it of the entire capital stock
of the new company, which was to be distributed at once by the old com
pany to its stockholders pro rata. These arrangements were carried out
in like manner in both cases, except that in the case of the Kansas com
panies the stock of the pipe-line company was issued directly to the stock
holders of the oil company, whereas in the case of the Ohio companies
the pipe-line company issued its stock to the oil company, but in the same
resolution by which the contract was made, an immediate distribution of
the new stock among the oil company’s stockholders was provided for, and
in fact it was carried out. The aggregate valuation of the Prairie pipe
lines was $27,000,000, that of the Ohio pipe lines $20,000,000, and the total
capitalization of the respective pipe-line companies equaled these amounts.
In each case, the oil company had a surplus in excess of the stated
value of its pipe lines and of the par value of the total stock of the corre
sponding pipe-line company; so that the transfer of the pipe lines and the
distribution of the stock received for them left the capital of the respective
oil companies unimpaired and required no reduction in their outstanding
issues.
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Messrs. Rockefeller and Harkness, respectively, were holders of large
amounts of the stock of both the Prairie and the Ohio oil companies and
in the distributions each received an amount of stock in each of the pipe
line companies proportionate to his holdings in the oil companies. This
occurred in the year 1915. Neither Mr. Rockefeller nor Mr. Harkness nor
the latter’s executors sold any of the stock in the pipe-line companies.
Income-tax assessments for the year 1915 were imposed upon Messrs.
Rockefeller and Harkness, based upon the value of the stocks thus
received as dividends; and these assessments are in question in the present
suits, both of which were brought in the district court of the United States
for the southern district of New York; one by the United States against
Mr. Rockefeller, the other by the executors of Mr. Harkness against the
collector.. In each case the facts were specially pleaded so as to present
the question whether the distribution of the stocks of the pipe-line com
panies among the stockholders of the oil companies constituted, under the
circumstances, dividends within the meaning of the act of 1913, and income
within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. In each case a final
judgment was rendered sustaining the assessment, and the judgments are
brought here by direct writs of error under section 238, judicial code,
because of the constitutional question.
.’ Under the facts as recited we deem it to be too plain for dispute that
in. both cases the new pipe-line company shares were in substance and effect
distributed by the oil company to its stockholders; as much so in the case
of the Kansas company where the new stock went directly from the pipe
line company to the stockholders of the oil company, as in the case of
the Ohio company where the new stock went from the pipe-line company
to the oil company and by it was transferred to its stockholders. Looking
to the substance of things the difference is unessential. In each case the
consideration moved from the oil company in its corporate capacity, the
new company’s stock issued in exchange for it was distributed among
the oil company’s stockholders in their individual capacity, and was a
substantial fruit of their ownership of stock in the oil company, in effect
a dividend out of the accumulated surplus.
The facts are in all essentials indistinguishable from those presented
in United States v. Phellis, decided this day. In these cases as in that,
regarding the general effect of the entire transactions resulting from the
combined action of the mass of stockholders, there was apparently little
but a reorganization and financial readjustment of the affairs of the com
panies concerned, here a subdivision of companies, without immediate
effect upon the personnel of the stockholders, or much difference in the
aggregate corporate activities or properties. As in the Phellis case, the
adoption of the new arrangements did not of itself produce any increase
of wealth to the stockholders, since whatever was gained by each in the
value of his new pipe-line stock was at the same moment withdrawn
through a corresponding diminution of the value of his oil stock. Never
theless the new stock represented assets of the oil companies standing in
the place of the pipe-line properties that before had constituted portions
of their surplus assets, and it was capable of division among stockholders
as the pipe-line properties were not. The distribution, whatever its effect
upon the aggregate interests of the mass of stockholders, constituted in the
case of each individual a gain in the form of actual exchangeable assets
transferred to him from the oil company for his separate use in partial
realization of his former indivisible and contingent interest in the cor
porate surplus. It was in substance and effect, not. merely in form, a
dividend of profits by the corporation, and individual income to the stock
holder.
The opinion just delivered in United States v. Phellis sufficiently indi
cates the ground of our conclusion that the judgment in each of the present
cases must be affirmed.
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Mr. Justice Clarke took no part in the consideration or decision of
these cases.
Mr. Justice Van Devanter and Mr. Justice McReynolds dissent.
(T. D. 3272—January 19, 1922.)
Income tax—Extension of time in which to file fiduciary returns (Form
1041), and partnership and personal-service corporation returns
(Form 1065).
Under the authority of section 227 of the revenue act of 1921, a general
extension of time is hereby granted up to and including May 15, 1922,
in which to file fiduciary returns (form 1041), partnership and personal
service corporation returns (form 1065), and information returns cover
ing compensation paid to employees (forms 1099 and 1096) which may
be required to be filed in connection with the fiduciary and partnership
and personal-service corporation returns. This extension is granted with
respect to the returns above mentioned which are required to be filed for
the calendar year 1921 or for any fiscal year ending in 1921.
(T. D. 3273—January 23, 1922.)
Income returns—Copies of—Access to returns.
Extension of T. D. 2962 to govern income returns made pursuant to
Titles II and III and section 1000, Title X, of the revenue act of 1921.
The provisions of T. D. 2962, issued under date of January 7, 1920,
governing the furnishing of copies of income returns, the giving to state
officials of access to income returns of corporations, associations, jointstock companies and insurance companies, and the examination by a
stockholder of the annual income returns of a corporation made pur
suant to titles II and III and section 1000, title X, of the revenue act
of 1918, are, so far as applicable, hereby extended and adopted as regulations
governing the same purposes under the similar provisions of titles II and
III and section 1000, title X, of the revenue act of 1921.

Frank Hormuth & Co. announces the opening of offices at 605 Matthews
building, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

A. P. MacGregor and Lyle W. Hines announce the formation of a
partnership under the firm name of MacGregor & Hines, with offices at
406 Metropolitan Bank building, St. Paul, Minnesota.
Gotthilf, Berkowitz & Co. announce the opening of an office in the
Columbia building, Washington, D. C.

Carlton George Van Emon announces the opening of an office in the
New Davidson building, Washington, D. C.
Robert M. Holzman announces the removal of his office to 608 Perry
building, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

L. T. Diebels and A. F. Schumacher announce the formation of a
partnership under the firm name of Diebels & Schumacher, with offices
at 240 Montgomery street, San Francisco, California.
Murray Herron and A. K. Livingston announce the formation of a
partnership under the firm name of Murray Herron & Co. with offices
at 79 West Monroe street, Chicago, Illinois.
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